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Appellant Teresa Greene respectfully submits her Reply Brief in the above Appeal 
proceedings. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant does not contest Appellee's representations as to the appropriate Standard of 
Review or the statutes and rules it contends will govern the Court's resolution of this Appeal. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts outlined in Appellee's Statement of the Case are accurate and indeed highlight the 
controversy between the parties. They reflect that Jensen, Ms. Greene's prior counsel, and Pitcher, 
UTA's Claims Adjuster, exchanged telephone calls and written correspondence prior to the August 
1999 submittal of Appellant's Notice of Claim.1 The numerous communications between Jensen 
and Pitcher, be they written or verbal, point out not only the factual disputes here present but also 
highlight Appellant's and Judge Henriod's concerns about UTA engaging in a course of conduct 
designed to mislead otherwise deserving claimants. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As elsewhere, Appellee's Summary of the Argument disingenuously misconstrues Teresa 
Greene's estoppel contentions. For instance, Appellant does not necessary believe Pitcher or anyone 
else at UTA had an affirmative duty to notify counsel that the Notice of Claim was defective. 
*UTA's "Statement" describes the August 6,1999, submittal as a "letter" which 
"purported to be a Notice of Claim." Such a characterization should not suggest to the Court that 
it did not comply with the substantive requirements of the Governmental Act. There should not 
now be nor has there previously been a challenge to the Notice's compliance with the content 
demands of UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11. It is only service of the Notice which is at issue. 
1 
Instead, Appellant challenges the intentional misdirection given Jensen by Pitcher during one of their 
pre-notice conversations, to-wit: that the Claims Adjuster was authorized to receive the Notice of 
Claim. Nor does Greene reject the notion that her counsel was primarily responsible for determining 
who within UTA's organization was to receive the Notice. But accepting this notion does not 
excuse Pitcher's conduct nor prevent application of the principles the Utah Appellate Courts 
announced in the numerous opinions relied upon by Appellant and cited in her opening Brief.2 As 
the cited cases also reflect, and contrary to the discussion at P. 7 of Appellee's Brief, one does not 
always need written representations from Governmental officials before the Courts will evoke 
estoppel. So while Pitcher's representations to Jensen were not written, they were clear, 
unmistakable and more than adequate for Plaintiffs counsel to rely upon in serving the Notice of 
Claim. 
Finally, Appellee's Summary of Argument suggests there were "numerous preclusive errors" 
in the Notice of Claim. Not only does Appellee fail to even remotely describe the same, there has 
not previously been any challenge to the substantive effectiveness of the Notice nor was such the 
basis for Judge Henriod's dismissal. Hence, such a statement is not only irrelevant but inaccurate. 
ARGUMENT 
L WHETHER APPELLANT COMPLIED WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL ACT 
IS DISPUTED 
Admittedly, under the Act a notice of claim upon an entity such as UTA must be "directed 
and delivered to . . . the President or Secretary of the Board". UTAH CODE ANN. 
2Bischel v. Merrit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995); and Britain v. State, 882, P.2d 666 
(Utah App. 1994); and Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). 
2 
§ 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(D). Had Jensen directed the Notice to UTA's President or Secretary of the 
Board, this would have constituted not simply compliance but strict compliance. The only 
reasonable argument Appellee can offer is that Ms. Greene's prior counsel failed to strictly comply 
with the Act. 
II WHILE UTAH LAW GENERALLY REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE ACT, THIS IS NOT ALWAYS THE CASE 
In replying to the remainder of Appellee's Brief, it is initially useful to outline the substantive 
requirements of a claims' notice. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11(3)(A) provides the notice is 
sufficient if it sets forth: a brief statement of the facts; the nature of the claim asserted; and, the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. Subpart B of the cited section then 
requires the notice to be signed by the person making the claim or that person's attorney; and that 
it be directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity. As discussed briefly above, 
while Appellee hints that the Notice Jensen prepared and delivered did not comply, UTA fails to 
specify its adequacies nor did Judge Henriod identify the same when he tersely ruled it did not even 
substantially comply with the Act. If Appellant had not substantially complied, it is quite likely we 
would not be here today and Ms. Greene would not be asking the Court to review Pitcher's conduct 
and reverse Judge Henriod's ruling. But Utah Courts have consistently applied estoppel principles 
to the Immunity Act permitting a plaintiff to proceed with his or her claim where the Act's policies 
have been met and injustice would result from dismissal. Facts surrounding the service of Teresa 
Greene's Notice easily justifies such relief. 
Appellee is correct in arguing that strict compliance with the Act is generally required. The 
cases UTA relies upon do indeed stand for such a premise. But aside from stating this general 
3 
principle underlying governmental immunity law, the cases and Appellee's arguments flowing 
therefrom offer little assistance to the Court in resolving our appeal. 
III. APPELLANT'S ESTOPPEL AND UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES CLAIMS 
EXCUSE STRICT COMPLIANCE 
While acknowledging that strict compliance with the service requirements of the act is 
typically the rule, numerous Utah cases have carved out exceptions thereto. Appellee's Brief has 
not provided this Court with any basis to reject applying such exceptions in our circumstances. 
Pitcher's failure to inform Jensen and others of their noncompliance does not standing alone 
warrant reversal. It is, nonetheless, pertinent to this Court's inquiry*. Coupled with facts discovered 
in the Serrato and Koch cases (cited in the opening Brief) and Pitcher's own candid admissions, his 
actions upon receiving arguably proper notices of claims is reprehensible and contrary to the 
purposes of the Act.3 
Appellee's attempts to distinguish the pending appeal from Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority 
are similarly unpersuasive. While Serrato admittedly involved a prior version of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 63-30-11, it nonetheless represents another example of David Pitcher (or others within UTA's 
organization) misadvising claimants as to who should receive their notices of claim. Not only should 
UTA's conduct outrage this Court, as it did Judge Henriod, it gives great weight to Jensen's 
Affidavit that Pitcher made the complained of statements. UTA's attack on to Jensen's account of 
the subject telephone conversation (set forth at P. 15 of its Brief) becomes suspect. 
3UTA challenges Ms. Greene's reliance upon Koch v. Utah Transit Authority, Civil No. 
970904524 PL Appellant's counsel acknowledges the Koch case was dismissed based upon a 
settlement. What Appellee fails to recognize is that UTA defended the action based upon an 
allegedly improperly served Notice which had been delivered to Pitcher based upon his 
instructions, similar to what here occurred. 
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Estoppel typically requires reasonable reliance on the part of the individual raising the 
argument. Appellee asserts Jensen's reliance was unreasonable because Plaintiffs counsel did not 
M
 familiarize himself with the Act's express delivery requirements". And indeed 20/20 hindsight tells 
us that Jensen was a bit naive in accepting Pitcher's representations. But a little naivete neither 
excuses Pitcher's actions nor makes the reliance unreasonable. Jensen correctly knew Pitcher was 
responsible for handling the claim. Pitcher himself testified to the extensive authority he has within 
UTA's organization and further stated he is the ultimate recipient of a notice of claim regardless of 
whom it was initially delivered to. Based on Jensen's past experience and dealings with UTA on 
personal injury matters, it simply made sense when Pitcher said, "send me the Notice". 
CONCLUSION 
This Appeal presents a compelling set of circumstances for the Court to apply principles 
which excuse strict compliance with the delivery requirements of Utah's Governmental Immunity 
Act. Conversely, if the Court does not reverse Judge Henriod's dismissal, it will tacitly pardon 
agregious conduct of a UTA official who has repeatedly tricked otherwise worthy claimants into 
forfeiting their claims. Based on these and other reasons set out in Appellant's opening Brief, Teresa 
Greene respectfully urges the Court to reverse the Trial Court's dismissal of this Complaint and 
permit it to proceed on its substantive merits. 
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